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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN BRADSHAW~ 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
ENG8NE N. DAVIE and 
MRS. ENGENE N. DAVIE~ 
Appellants. 
Case 
No. 9094 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'N .. hile in most instances the appellants' statement of 
facts is substantially correct, there is no question that 
it is intended to .shO\V that the respondent \vas the mov-
ing party in initiating the partnership agreement. Peru-
sal of the testimony of both the appellant and the re-
spondent will indicate that both parties took part in the 
negotiations and that they were over a considerable per-
iod of time .. Regardless of what was the moving factor in 
these negotiations, on the 30th of March, 1957, a partner .. 
ship agreement came out of these negotiations, which 
has been identified in the pleadings as p laintiff~s Exhibit 
1, which i5 the only wr-itten agreement that was actually 
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signed by both of the parties. As a result thereof, the 
parties entered into said partnership and made some 
limited attempt to develop the property. The trial court 
had to find \Vhat property ""~as invoJved in the partner-
ship, who \Vas responsible for the breach, and what dam-
ages should be awarded, if any. While it may have been 
the appellants intention not to pay to the respondent the 
S400+00 a month for his labor, at the same time the appel .. 
lant 'vell knew the agreement requiring the respondent to 
put in his time on the partnership~ ]eft no way for him 
to make a living for his wife and family. Under these 
conditions, \Vhen the $4CXl00 simply did not come, even 
though demanded by the respondent! and the appellant 
never refused to pay it, but simply failed and neglected 
to pay it, there can be only .one conclusion, and that was 
that something had to happen. The Memorandum of 
Decision of the court and the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of I.aw take care of this fact situation and state 
the courts findings pertaining to this fact situation~ 
.After the signing of the agreement on 30 March 1957, 
upon \Vhich this partnership \vns founded~ the respondent 
\Vent ahead and put in full ~imc upon the claims and 
continued putting in full time on the work of the partner-
ship, until such time as he was stopped from doing so 
because of the equipment being taken a\vay from the 
partnership. This equipment \Vas taken a\vay from the 
partnership because of the failure of the appellant to 
make the payments on same, which he had agreed to 
make out of the partnership agreement of 30 March, 1957. 
At ~his time there is no question that the partnership 
had been breached by the appellant because he had failed 
to provide the equipment that he had agreed to provide. 
This failure to provide the equipment that the appellant 
had agreed to provide, was not caused by the respondent 
demanding money, but was caused specifically by the 
factor of the lack of profits and the appel1ant could see 
they were not going to get any contract and that the 
m.a tter was not an econon1 i cal) feasible operation~ {See 
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Report, page 104, line 20). '"'I would say that the factor 
of Jack of profits and the fact that it did cost more to 
strip and mine and haul th1s material to the railroad is 
certainly an important thing. And it was obvious that the 
cost \vas higher than what we were getting out of it. And 
then there were other circumstances involved. And by 
that time I knew other things about this property; and 
\YC both knrHv things about it now that haven't even been 
mentioned yet, that also increased the cost factor.n Based 
upon the appellant's own testimony as cited above, it 
becomes quite apparent that he reached a conclusion that 
there was no profit in this matter and that it was his in-
tention to break the contract. That he did so by failing 
to make the payment to keep the equipment around so 
that the claims could be worked~ 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DIS-
MISS THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COUR'T DID NOT ERR I;\ GRANTING 
JUDGlVIENT AGAINST DEFENDANT~ 
Point m 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IX AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE JUDGMENT 
AGAIN"ST THE DEFENDANT FOR ~11.,562.08. 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE IN" ITS AC-
CQLTNTING ALL FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE PLAIN"-
TIFF FROM ANY TRANSACTIONS .. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COUR1., DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT AGAII\TST THE DEFENDANT. 
Point VI 
TilE ACCOUNTING ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
'VAS NOT IN CONTRA VENTI ON OF THE RULES OF 
DISTRIBlJTION AND ACCOUNTING OF PARTNER-
SHIPS. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS ACTION. 
At any time when an accounting is refused or not fur-
nished there is no question that an action may be main-
tained in equity for such an accounting and that this is 
a ma1ter of equity jurisprudence4 In the case of Decorso 
vs. Thomas et aL found in 89 Utah 160, 50 Pac. 2d 951, 
\Vhich is one of the later cases decided by the Utah State 
Supreme Court, it was held that the action of one part-
ner for an accounting and for the dissolution of a co .. part-
nership is a proper subject matter of equity jurispru-
dence4 In this case the court cited 5 Pomeroy's Equity 
Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, page 5223~ Section 2363, in 
which this rule was enunciated. 
The cases cited by the appellant in support of his Point 
I all contend that while at law it is not proper to bring 
an action for accounting, that it is a proper equity ac-
tion. In the case cited by appellant of Bankers Trust Co~ 
v. Ritert 56 Utah 525, 190 Pac~ 1113, in ""'"'hich the univer-
sal ru1e has shown on Page 7 of Appellants' Brief was set 
forth, the case goes further and holds that the trial court 
judgment should be affirmed and in affinning this judg-
ment that an action for accounting may be maintained 
if it appears necessary and a judgment rendered based 
upon said accountlngr Also in the case of Jennings v. 
Pratt~ 19 Utah 129, 56 Pac. 951, in which appellant quotes 
the rule, uThe rule is doubtless well settled thatJ in the 
absence of a settlement of accounts, one partner cannot 
sue another at la\v upon a demand which has grown out 
of a partnership transaction~ but~ where the claim of one 
partner against. co-partners arises out of a transaction 
r·.~hich is not properly a partnership matter, the rule does 
not apply.'J In Jennings v. Pratt, the case was actually 
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on a question ans1ng outside the partnership and the 
court held that the rule was not applicable in that par .. 
ticular case. The general rule pertaining to this matter 
is found in 58 A~ L+ R+ 623, and 168 A. L. R. 1091 and is 
set forth as follows: r'The remedy of a co .. partner who 
desires to recover his share of the firm assets is through 
an equity action for an accounting and a settlement of 
the parln ers hip affairs~~' 
It appears that appellant in his Brief has attempted to 
separate law and equity and has also failed to give effect 
to the joinder of law and equity. Every authority cited by 
the appellant in support of his position in Point I of his 
Brief carried to the conclusion actually holds that the 
proper remedy is to bring an action for accounting in 
equity. Ce rtaini y the joinder of la\v and equity into one 
court systemt as \Ve no\v have the matter, indicates that 
the proper place to bring an action for an accounting is 
in the present colU'ts. 
To carry appellant's position in Point I to its utter ab-
surdity produces the following result~ You can not have 
an action on a partnership without an accounting. You 
can not get an accounting at la,v, therefore~ if a partner 
refuses to give an accountingj there is no remedy. Cer-
tainly, this is not the position our courts should hold and 
certainly~ it is an utter absurdity to urge this position. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
In relation to Point II of the Appellant, the Court's at-
tention is invited to the follo,ving items: (1) There must 
be some great error in the report of this matter, the copy 
of the Report in the possession of the respondentt where 
cited at page 8 in Appel1ants~ Brie{ at page 389-392 ap-
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parent1y does not read the same as the copy of the Report 
in the possession of Appellant. In the Appellants~ Brief 
it is apparently questioning Dr. Davie, the defendant .. In 
the copy of the Report in the possession of the respond-
ent1 this part of the testimony and the Report is the tes-
timony oi Mr. Bradsha\\·. 
(2) On page 329~ which in the Brief purports to be the 
testimony of the plaintiff in the copy of Report in pos-
~ession of the respondent, it is the testimony of Dr. Davie~ 
(3) On page 12 of the Appellants' Brief where page 
383-.'3.84 is cited~ as testimony of defendant it actually ap-
pears in the copy in the possession of the respondent as 
the testimony of Mr. Elton. At the trial court in its Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Finding No. 15, 
sets out (~That the defendant did not advance any further 
money for purchase of equipment for use in operation 
of said mining claims and on account of the repossession 
of the Caterpillar tractor and diesel tractor mentioned 
and the failure of the defendant to furnish other equip-
ment for operating said mining claims, the plaintiff 
ceased "=-orl<: upon said clrt. ims on or a bout September 14, 
1957/' 
On page 13 of Appellants' Brief appellant cites Jordan 
y~-. Madsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570 in support for his 
contention that the p·laintiff renounced that agreement 
and that said ranounccment amounted to a breach of the 
albreement. This is, of course~ a sales case that has been 
cited and is not a partnership case and in all probability:r 
before this particular citation and the restatement of 
contracts and such items as are cited therein comes into 
effert~ there must be a finding of renunciation by the 
plaintift At no time was there a renunciation of the 
agreement by the plaintifL What the plaintiff demand-
ed \vas a completion of the agreement and the payment 
of the 1noncys due under the agreement. The court's find-
ing as quoted above to the effect that the plaintiff ceased 
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\vork on a specific day,. due to the defendant's failure to 
provide the equipment he was supposed to provide 1Ulder 
the terms of the agreement amounts to a finding that up 
to that day, the plaintiff worked in conformity with the 
agreement and that the breach of the agreement was by 
the defendant failing to furnish this equipment. 
Point m 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE DEFEXDANT FOR $11,562.08. 
On page 15 of Appellants 7 Brief appellant cites Sec. 48-
1-37~ Utah Code Annotated 1953 as authority for his 
statement in his Point III that as a matter of law the 
trial court erred in awarding plaintiff the judgment 
against defendant for 811,562.08 based upon a partner· 
ship transaction and makes the amazing statement that 
Dr. Davie \vas a partner and as such had equal authority 
\\.dth plaintiff to buy or return equipmennt without such 
being regarded as \\Tongful conduct. Apparently the 
a ppcllant takes the position that this is sufficient reason 
to give a'vay va1uable property "'~ithout making any at-
tempt to mitigate a loss or any other item thereon. Again 
to carry this position to its absurdity, as Ion g as one of 
the partners gave away all of the partnership property 
there should be no liability to the other partner. If one 
'vere going to criticize the trial co ures finding that the 
assets of the partnership were $14t889~49less of the value 
due to the appellant giving away and allowing the repos-
session of these items of machinery, one should say that 
the value of the machinery as assets of the partnership 
were the purchase price of the n1achinery less ~he depre-
ciation and that this was the loss, caused by the giving 
fn\·ay of this property. If one took this position it ,,·ould 
0f cot~rse~ mean that this machinery was a great deal 
n!ore \·aJ.uable than the 514,889.49, v~~hich the court found. 
8 .· 
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While the respondent does not believe that the court 
erred in this finding and does not, by bringing these 
figures up, \Vish to make this complaint or any implica· 
tion of error, certainly this figure adds to the Joss to 
the partnership occasioned by the allowing of the repos-
session of this equipment is very conservative~ The pur-
chase price of the diesel tractor was $17t967.00 .. The diesel 
tractor to pull truck with at a purchase price of $3500.0<1 
The total of these items amounts to S21,476400. Had the 
appellant furnished the $20,000.00 for these purposes as 
he had agreed to furnish and had they been applied on 
these particular items~ it is qtdte possible that the loss 
instead of being in the neighborhood of $14POOO.OO was 
actually in the neighborhood of $21~476 .. 00. Certainly the 
trial coures action in limiting this loss to the l.Olpaid 
balance rather than the full purchase price was conser-
vative and certainly the appellant is the last person in 
the \Vorld that should take exception to this finding in 
the trial court. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE IN ITS AC-
COUNTING ALL FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE PLAIN· 
TIFF FROM ANY TRANSACTIONS. 
In the first p1ace the trial court did not refuse to con-
sider the alleged "secret funds." Actually there was noth-
i'ng secret about them. They \Vere openly accounted 
for by the respondent in his direct examination~ The 
trial court simply found there was no profit from the 
sale of such rna terials after allowance for expense of 
labor and transportation to market~ If appellant takes 
exception to this finding~ even though on page 15 of Ap-
pellants~ Brief appellant cites "It is even more astound 
\vhen one considers that an unprofitable operation is a 
basist in and of itself, for dissolution.~~ Apparently appeJ .. 
ant takes the attitude that an unprofitable operation is 
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grounds for dissolution and is grounds for the appellant 
not bringing forth the money,. but even though it was 
unprofitable that all the operation that the respondent 
had should be accounted and paid .. It appears to be rather 
inconsistent that on page 16 of Appellants' Brief, appal~ 
lant takes the position ''The Partnership is entitled to the 
reasonable market value of 1066 tons of the pumice ma-
terial and Bradshaw is required by 1a\v to account for 
itn And yet in the Report on page 104 at line 20 appel-
ant takes the position that the lack of profit and the 
cost items were the very items that caused the failure 
of this partnership and caused the dissolution~ It would 
seem that it all depends upon who is conducting the 
operation \Vhether or not a non-profit item of this nature 
should be considered. Appellant apparently failed to con-
sider the Section of Utah Code Annotated same being 
48·1 .... 18, which is quoted by appellant on page 16t ~~Every 
partner must account to the partnership for any benefitt 
and hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by him 
without the consent of the other partners from any tran-
saction connected with the formation, conduct or liquida-
tion of the partnership .or from any use by him of its 
property .. ' ' Apparently appellant has entirely missed the 
gist of this Section. There is a part in this section to the 
effect that there has to be profit+ When the trial court 
specifically found that no profit was rea~ized from the 
sa 1 es of such material after allo~ring expense of lab or 
and transportation to market, then cer1ainly it takes 
this Point IV of appellants, Brief entirely out of cons.id-
eration .. The Code itself~ removes this. 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
PL.AINTIFF~ JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFEXDANT .. 
Appellants~ citation to B .. T~ Moran, Inc~ v .. First Se-
curity.Corporation~ 82 Utah 316,24 Pac. 2d 384~ is entirely 
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out of line in this particular case. The B. T. Moran~ Inc. 
v_ First Security Corporation case has a question of a 
contract for the production of goods and there is no 
partnership question in it whatsoever. 
Finding No. 27 is an express finding of an amount of 
money O\Ved by the appellant to the respondent under 
the original agreement. Finding No+ 28 of of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law i.s an express finding that 
because certain items are lost to the partnership and 
assets of the partnership are reduced by the then value 
of said items, this is an express finding of a reduction 
of the value of the partnership. Certainly a·ny item that 
re(~e_ces the assets of the partnership is harmful to all 
p[u·tncrs and is certainly a proper finding of damage .. 
Point VI 
THE ACCOlJNTING ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS r\"OT IX CONTRA VENTI ON OF THE RULES OF 
DISTRIBUTIOX AND ACCOUNTING OF PARTNER-
SHIPS. 
It seems as though appellants~ position is that appel-
lant should be reimbursed for any advances made by ap-
pellant but that it \vould be improper to reimburse there-
spondent for the property contributed to the partnership 
by the respondent4 Can it be any more said that a cash ad-
vancement for an interest in a partnership is any more of 
a contribution than the property which is the basis of the 
entire partnership? By the terms of the agreemen~ neith-
er the contribution of the appellant \Vas to be returned to 
him except by profits of the partnership, nor was the 
twenty-five cents per ton royalty to the amount of 
$20,000.00 to be returned to the respondent except on the 
profits of the partnership. Thus the court so found4 Until 
there \Vere profits of said partnership in an operation 
from which these items could be paid~ there was ·no duty 
11 
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of the partnership to pay these items to either party. 
The court ha.s very properly eliminated them from con .. 
sidera ti on. If a co ntrib uti on is going to be considered, 
then it \vould be entirely proper to consider the contribu-
tion of the respondent and also at the time of the part-
nership agreement apparently both parties felt that the 
property being contributed by the respondent was of 
sufficient value to justify considerable expenditure in 
developing samer On page 21 of Appellants~ Brief the 
appellant makes the following statement, " It is obvious 
and apparent that the contributions by the partners to 
the partnership were so manifestly disproportionate that 
a conclusion of law that the partners should be declared 
equal O\vners in the remaining assets cannot possibly be 
justified as a matter of law or equity.'~ If this statement 
is correct} then it must be said that in entering into the 
partnership agreement on an equal basis neither of the 
partners had any idea of what they were doing There 
is no question that certain moneys \Vere to be advanced 
and paid out of the partnership profits. There is no ques-
tion that certain royalties \Vere to be paid to the respond-
ent out of partnership profits. The $5,000.00 to be paid 
by the appellant to the respondent was never to be repaid 
in any manner unless it \Vas to be repaid out of the part-
nership profits. Until all these items accrued and there 
were profits, there was no provision \Vhatsoever for the 
repayment of any item.. Certainly if the appellant felt 
that the property was of sufficient value to justify the 
investment of this type of money in this operation then 
the property itself \\:~s of sufficient contribution to equal 
all of the moneys that were to have been contributed by 
the appellant. 
l2. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgn1ent of the trial court should be affirmed .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Patrick H. Fenton 
Attorney for Respondent 
13 \Vest Hoover Ave. 
Cedar City~ Utah. 
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